The new iPhone 17 model supports Apple’s AI tools, features faster wireless charging, and includes the new C1X modem developed by the company’s silicon team.
Apologies for the late reply, sometimes I’m not in a good spot to chase down leaks about cop shit.
As of at least 2021 cellebrite claims they have the ability to access xiaomi and huawei devices, listing explicitly the soc and baseband chips used by the very phones you are claiming are safe because of their lack of amerisraieli death pact ties.
A famous leak of their support matrix from 2024 confirms this and also explicitly groups android devices by their soc/baseband chips. Reenforcing that the chips ostensibly with no ties to the amerisraeli death cult are not any more secure or private than ones with those ties.
The point of those is to quickly draw a line that connects the past to the present. We see the same claims, then the affirmation of those claims reported by a third party.
I think in a vacuum, assuming perfectly spherical semiconductor manufacturing industries and leaving software out of the picture, the point you’re trying to make is the most materialist take: you can’t trust the imperialists tech, the masters tools cannot be used to tear down the plantation, etc.
In our present day with a hundred years plus of semiconductor manufacturing history encompassing real countries whose attitudes towards one another and development have changed significantly during that span, given reliable information about the explicit capacities western (and lest be serious here, any) le or intelligence apparatus has, the most materialist take is that there’s more to the choice of what device to trust than where the chips come from.
To butcher a car metaphor, what you’re saying is similar to people claiming buying and driving a Tesla is better than a BYD because you can’t trust Chinese tech. That idea might be fine (or chauvinist) in a bubble but when we can evaluate the Tesla and BYD for ourselves in a parking lot or on the road we might come away with wildly different ideas.
Technology has to be evaluated based on its capabilities and how it’s being used when that’s possible and I would argue it’s extremely possible in the case of security in phones and that if you think you’re gonna be scooped by the cops you need to be on graphene, the latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android.
So that’s still from half a decade ago. Again, it’s not impossible that US and Israel could find vulnerabilities in devices built on an independent stack, but at least it’s not part of the design there. And that means these vulnerabilities get fixed over time. Your support matrix from 2024 does not show a single Chinese made device which proves my point. It’s US based tech stacks that are compromised.
The point I’m making is this. One tech stack might have vulnerabilities due to negligence and human error, the other has backdoors baked in by design.
Just because something is a SoC or not is not really relevant. That’s just a type of architecture. What matters is if the specific implementation is compromised or not. I’m not aware of any evidence that recent Chinese devices are compromised. However, your own link shows that iphones are.
You’re right that chips alone aren’t the deciding factor, but they are the core of the stack, and if your hardware is compromised then it really doesn’t matter what your software is doing at that point.
While there might be a case for graphene being the most secure software stack, the hardware could still betray you and there’s little graphene could do about that. Meanwhile, there is zero evidence for the claim that latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android are preferable to HarmonyOS or HyperOS. If anything, you yourself just showed that iOS should not be trusted.
The point of using the company claims from 2021 and the famous leak from 2024 was to establish a pattern, not to suggest that information from that long ago could be applied directly to this present moment.
The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.
It can be established because the company’s claims forever were “we can do this” and finally there was a leak showing in pretty good detail that they weren’t lying.
Page 3: supported extraction listed for android devices by chipset includes huaweis ostensibly non amerisraeli hardware stack. Secured container extraction supported for both huawei and xiaomi implementations present in harmonyos and hyperos.
Page 4: huawei and xiaomi devices listed as brute force able in both on and off device states (there are notably some exceptions here, some qualcomm chipsets take a day and the p40 phones with their software updates weren’t brute forceable).
Page 5: huawei and xiaomi, realme, oppo, oneplus and zte are listed as brute forceable in off and on states.
here’s the same thing but for ios. I’m tired and it gives much more precise detail on a narrower range of devices, so I’ll just summarize:
Six year old iphones running a month old os version were safe from even “after first unlock” (the most unsafe locked state) compromise.
some phones running the one and a half year old ios in a “before first unlock” state (the most secure locked state) were subject to a brute forcer that was limited to 5000 attempts per day. That sounds like a lot, but a six digit pin would need constant hammering for 200 straight days. Not unheard of but a very far cry from the “plug it up, get access” that is advertised, documented in many security outlets and something I have literally observed happening inside a cop car at a protest.
So to summarize: as of two years ago, the ostensibly non amerisraeli tech stack was not secure against the cops. Harmonyos and hyperos were not secure against the cops. Out of date ios and pixel phones were also not secure.
I want to make clear that what is explicitly shown with regard to pixels and iphones is definitley true of all device families: the newest stuff has fewer vulnerabilities because people just haven’t been pounding on it as much.
Again, this is intended to help people to make good choices using real world information as opposed to predictions. If I were buying a phone to resist the cops, it would be an iphone or a pixel with graphene.
The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.
Ok, but what does this have to do with the discussion we’re having here. I never said anything to suggest using old phones and operating systems. I repeatedly said I’m talking about new devices here.
Again, while there could be an argument for a pixel with graphene, it happens to be what I’m currently using because I can’t get a Huawei device in Canada, there is zero evidence that stock pixel or iphone are preferable to LATEST Huawei or Xiaomi for people who have the choice.
So we don’t have access to the most up to date information on the most recent iteration of cop hardware and software for breaking into phones.
If either one of us did, it would be a very bad idea to say that we were basing our argumentation on that.
Based instead on historical data points, like the ones I’ve provided, we can consistently see that at those points in time the latest stock pixel and iphone devices were preferable to anything else including the latest huawei and xiaomi devices for the purposes of avoiding cop access.
The reason I’ve been engaging with your argument that the latest xiaomi/huawei stuff is preferable to the pixel/iphone equivalent is that I’m concerned someone worried about cops might make a decision about how to use their limited resources based on that argument.
They’re not bad phones or bad companies and China isn’t a bad country. There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.
My whole point separate of yours (that I’m paraphrasing here, apologies) that devices made outside the amerisraeli apparatus are inherently safer is that we need to pay attention to the wealth of information about phone security rather than base our decisions on assumptions.
Based on historical data points we clearly see that both Android and iOS devices were vulnerable. Your own links shows this clearly. There is no evidence to suggest that Chinese devices are more vulnerable.
There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.
No, there isn’t. You keep saying this, but you haven’t provided a single source showing that these devices are more vulnerable.
The latest link you provide once again shows that many Android devices are vulnerable. But cellebrite is just one rootkit, not the totality of vulnerabilities either. That’s the whole problem. You’re ignoring what hardware backdoors may be present in US supply chain, and what other rootkits might exist.
Given that the US is a known bad actor, it has to be assumed that these devices are not safe. That’s just the reality of the situation. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have every incentive to make their devices safe from western malware and have zero incentive to put in backdoors for US or Israel in them. That’s what makes these devices inherently safer. The incentives matter.
graphene is at the top, then stock pixel then literally everything else.
Again, this is a baseless claim that is not supported by the evidence you’ve provided. Unless you can show proof that Chinese current devices have vulnerabilities that are not present in current stock Android, then you need to retract your claim.
Okay, to address just the request for proof that the security order is graphene, stock pixel then everything else, look at the 2025 link I posted, table 2, android access support matrix - locked devices:
Huawei - cold and hot brute force extraction at least partially supported
Pixel - second column of both cold and hot sections, brute force password to decrypt user ce and brute force password are marked not supported.
Xiaomi - bottom row, hot and cold extraction and brute forcing supported.
So there you go, pixel over xiaomi and huawei. If you need proof that graphene is at the top, compare the standard android and graphene columns in table 3: android os access support matrix - google pixel in the same most recent link.
I understand that you’re saying something else may be out there. You’re right, unknown security vulnerabilities might be around that have serious effects on non Chinese phones.
Im saying there are security vulnerabilities in the hands of police which are least effective against iphones, pixels and graphene and that it’s best to choose devices based on what you know as opposed to what you assume.
It really seems to me like I’m posting exactly what you say you need to see over and over again, what am I missing?
The devices in that table are ancient. We just keep going in circles here. Huawei doesn’t even run Android nowadays. I’m starting to get the impression you’re not even reading the links you’re using here. The chart even says this clearly that devices they can brute force are up to 2021:
It’s really tough to hear you imply I’m not reading the things I post when I made reference to the same p40 model fact earlier today.
In that same page, on the bottom row the same column that had the p40 comment referenced recently added support for the snapdragon 8 elite.
On the unlocked devices support matrix (they become unlocked devices once brute forced) support for the dimensity 9400 is referenced.
Those are both chips used in q4 ‘24 and forward phones and the cop hardware brute forces and extracts them in February of ‘25. That’s not ancient at that time by any measure and not even ancient by the standards of today.
On that same page support for private space and 2nd space are referenced (those are the name for containers that harmony and hyper use) indicating support for extracting and decrypting harmonyos and hyperos containers indicating support for cracking harmonyos and hyperos. I pointed this out earlier today.
The fact that older devices have notes on them does not mean newer devices are not supported.
Apologies for the late reply, sometimes I’m not in a good spot to chase down leaks about cop shit.
As of at least 2021 cellebrite claims they have the ability to access xiaomi and huawei devices, listing explicitly the soc and baseband chips used by the very phones you are claiming are safe because of their lack of amerisraieli death pact ties.
A famous leak of their support matrix from 2024 confirms this and also explicitly groups android devices by their soc/baseband chips. Reenforcing that the chips ostensibly with no ties to the amerisraeli death cult are not any more secure or private than ones with those ties.
The point of those is to quickly draw a line that connects the past to the present. We see the same claims, then the affirmation of those claims reported by a third party.
I think in a vacuum, assuming perfectly spherical semiconductor manufacturing industries and leaving software out of the picture, the point you’re trying to make is the most materialist take: you can’t trust the imperialists tech, the masters tools cannot be used to tear down the plantation, etc.
In our present day with a hundred years plus of semiconductor manufacturing history encompassing real countries whose attitudes towards one another and development have changed significantly during that span, given reliable information about the explicit capacities western (and lest be serious here, any) le or intelligence apparatus has, the most materialist take is that there’s more to the choice of what device to trust than where the chips come from.
To butcher a car metaphor, what you’re saying is similar to people claiming buying and driving a Tesla is better than a BYD because you can’t trust Chinese tech. That idea might be fine (or chauvinist) in a bubble but when we can evaluate the Tesla and BYD for ourselves in a parking lot or on the road we might come away with wildly different ideas.
Technology has to be evaluated based on its capabilities and how it’s being used when that’s possible and I would argue it’s extremely possible in the case of security in phones and that if you think you’re gonna be scooped by the cops you need to be on graphene, the latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android.
So that’s still from half a decade ago. Again, it’s not impossible that US and Israel could find vulnerabilities in devices built on an independent stack, but at least it’s not part of the design there. And that means these vulnerabilities get fixed over time. Your support matrix from 2024 does not show a single Chinese made device which proves my point. It’s US based tech stacks that are compromised.
The point I’m making is this. One tech stack might have vulnerabilities due to negligence and human error, the other has backdoors baked in by design.
Just because something is a SoC or not is not really relevant. That’s just a type of architecture. What matters is if the specific implementation is compromised or not. I’m not aware of any evidence that recent Chinese devices are compromised. However, your own link shows that iphones are.
You’re right that chips alone aren’t the deciding factor, but they are the core of the stack, and if your hardware is compromised then it really doesn’t matter what your software is doing at that point.
While there might be a case for graphene being the most secure software stack, the hardware could still betray you and there’s little graphene could do about that. Meanwhile, there is zero evidence for the claim that latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android are preferable to HarmonyOS or HyperOS. If anything, you yourself just showed that iOS should not be trusted.
The point of using the company claims from 2021 and the famous leak from 2024 was to establish a pattern, not to suggest that information from that long ago could be applied directly to this present moment.
The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.
It can be established because the company’s claims forever were “we can do this” and finally there was a leak showing in pretty good detail that they weren’t lying.
here is the entire pdf of the leaked android support matrix linked in the article I linked to above. It only goes model by model for pixels, partly because it’s illustrating their capabilities against graphene as opposed to stock android but likely also because there’s thousands of android phones and a model/os version matrix would be insane and have an endnotes page a mile long.
Page 3: supported extraction listed for android devices by chipset includes huaweis ostensibly non amerisraeli hardware stack. Secured container extraction supported for both huawei and xiaomi implementations present in harmonyos and hyperos.
Page 4: huawei and xiaomi devices listed as brute force able in both on and off device states (there are notably some exceptions here, some qualcomm chipsets take a day and the p40 phones with their software updates weren’t brute forceable).
Page 5: huawei and xiaomi, realme, oppo, oneplus and zte are listed as brute forceable in off and on states.
here’s the same thing but for ios. I’m tired and it gives much more precise detail on a narrower range of devices, so I’ll just summarize:
Six year old iphones running a month old os version were safe from even “after first unlock” (the most unsafe locked state) compromise.
some phones running the one and a half year old ios in a “before first unlock” state (the most secure locked state) were subject to a brute forcer that was limited to 5000 attempts per day. That sounds like a lot, but a six digit pin would need constant hammering for 200 straight days. Not unheard of but a very far cry from the “plug it up, get access” that is advertised, documented in many security outlets and something I have literally observed happening inside a cop car at a protest.
So to summarize: as of two years ago, the ostensibly non amerisraeli tech stack was not secure against the cops. Harmonyos and hyperos were not secure against the cops. Out of date ios and pixel phones were also not secure.
I want to make clear that what is explicitly shown with regard to pixels and iphones is definitley true of all device families: the newest stuff has fewer vulnerabilities because people just haven’t been pounding on it as much.
Again, this is intended to help people to make good choices using real world information as opposed to predictions. If I were buying a phone to resist the cops, it would be an iphone or a pixel with graphene.
Ok, but what does this have to do with the discussion we’re having here. I never said anything to suggest using old phones and operating systems. I repeatedly said I’m talking about new devices here.
Again, while there could be an argument for a pixel with graphene, it happens to be what I’m currently using because I can’t get a Huawei device in Canada, there is zero evidence that stock pixel or iphone are preferable to LATEST Huawei or Xiaomi for people who have the choice.
So we don’t have access to the most up to date information on the most recent iteration of cop hardware and software for breaking into phones.
If either one of us did, it would be a very bad idea to say that we were basing our argumentation on that.
Based instead on historical data points, like the ones I’ve provided, we can consistently see that at those points in time the latest stock pixel and iphone devices were preferable to anything else including the latest huawei and xiaomi devices for the purposes of avoiding cop access.
The reason I’ve been engaging with your argument that the latest xiaomi/huawei stuff is preferable to the pixel/iphone equivalent is that I’m concerned someone worried about cops might make a decision about how to use their limited resources based on that argument.
They’re not bad phones or bad companies and China isn’t a bad country. There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.
My whole point separate of yours (that I’m paraphrasing here, apologies) that devices made outside the amerisraeli apparatus are inherently safer is that we need to pay attention to the wealth of information about phone security rather than base our decisions on assumptions.
Heres yet another data point to go by, in this case presented as a blog analysis of the 2025 leak (only a little over a year old at this point!). there’s a million great bits of knowledge in that page if you’re interested in learning a ton about android security but the long and short of it for android devices is about the same as before: graphene is at the top, then stock pixel then literally everything else.
Based on historical data points we clearly see that both Android and iOS devices were vulnerable. Your own links shows this clearly. There is no evidence to suggest that Chinese devices are more vulnerable.
No, there isn’t. You keep saying this, but you haven’t provided a single source showing that these devices are more vulnerable.
The latest link you provide once again shows that many Android devices are vulnerable. But cellebrite is just one rootkit, not the totality of vulnerabilities either. That’s the whole problem. You’re ignoring what hardware backdoors may be present in US supply chain, and what other rootkits might exist.
Given that the US is a known bad actor, it has to be assumed that these devices are not safe. That’s just the reality of the situation. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have every incentive to make their devices safe from western malware and have zero incentive to put in backdoors for US or Israel in them. That’s what makes these devices inherently safer. The incentives matter.
Again, this is a baseless claim that is not supported by the evidence you’ve provided. Unless you can show proof that Chinese current devices have vulnerabilities that are not present in current stock Android, then you need to retract your claim.
Okay, to address just the request for proof that the security order is graphene, stock pixel then everything else, look at the 2025 link I posted, table 2, android access support matrix - locked devices:
Huawei - cold and hot brute force extraction at least partially supported
Pixel - second column of both cold and hot sections, brute force password to decrypt user ce and brute force password are marked not supported.
Xiaomi - bottom row, hot and cold extraction and brute forcing supported.
So there you go, pixel over xiaomi and huawei. If you need proof that graphene is at the top, compare the standard android and graphene columns in table 3: android os access support matrix - google pixel in the same most recent link.
I understand that you’re saying something else may be out there. You’re right, unknown security vulnerabilities might be around that have serious effects on non Chinese phones.
Im saying there are security vulnerabilities in the hands of police which are least effective against iphones, pixels and graphene and that it’s best to choose devices based on what you know as opposed to what you assume.
It really seems to me like I’m posting exactly what you say you need to see over and over again, what am I missing?
The devices in that table are ancient. We just keep going in circles here. Huawei doesn’t even run Android nowadays. I’m starting to get the impression you’re not even reading the links you’re using here. The chart even says this clearly that devices they can brute force are up to 2021:
It’s really tough to hear you imply I’m not reading the things I post when I made reference to the same p40 model fact earlier today.
In that same page, on the bottom row the same column that had the p40 comment referenced recently added support for the snapdragon 8 elite.
On the unlocked devices support matrix (they become unlocked devices once brute forced) support for the dimensity 9400 is referenced.
Those are both chips used in q4 ‘24 and forward phones and the cop hardware brute forces and extracts them in February of ‘25. That’s not ancient at that time by any measure and not even ancient by the standards of today.
On that same page support for private space and 2nd space are referenced (those are the name for containers that harmony and hyper use) indicating support for extracting and decrypting harmonyos and hyperos containers indicating support for cracking harmonyos and hyperos. I pointed this out earlier today.
The fact that older devices have notes on them does not mean newer devices are not supported.
We are indeed going in circles.