I read them before writing my OP. I’m still not sure what you’re getting at.

I would be grateful if you could say what you mean, instead of initiating an oblique guessing game.

Yes. Here are some common self-hosting scenarios:

• Home server containing family files: scans, photos, device backups, …
• Office server containing business files: sensitive documents, device backups, …
• Web or email server containing websites, Fediverse instances, emails, etc

In all those cases, full disk encryption (FDE) is a sensible precaution to protect the data in case the server is physically stolen.

Linux is probably the most common OS kernel for self-hosting. On Linux, LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) is probably the best FDE system. It’s mature and reliable. But anyone self-hosting a Linux server with LUKS FDE is faced with the question of where to store the keys.

Hardware security tokens (HSTs) are widely considered a safer place for keys than SSDs, HDDs, or USB storage. They follow the smartcard principle: a private key can be written to an HST but not read from it (security vulnerabilities excepted). Instead, they implement cryptographic algorithms to prove possession of the private key. So, anyone self-hosting a Linux server with LUKS FDE should strongly consider storing their private key(s) on an HST.

However, there is more than one way to do that. Hence the question in my OP.

Which of the 4 recipes I posted are you referring to as “this”?

Thanks, please post relevant steps if you have specific recommendations.

For plain text & Markdown, you don’t even need Collabora. Since 2019, NextCloud has a built-in collaborative text editor.

it’s the only way!

TBF I was trying to follow the docs, aber ich spreche kein Deutsch.

I overlooked this line from the docs:

Benötigt werden cmake, git, libgd und libusb - bei manchen Distributionen (z.B. Ubuntu) sind die Header-Files in separaten Paketen “libusb-dev” die ggf. noch nachinstalliert werden müssen.

I should have done sudo apt install libgd-dev libusb-1.0-0-dev before attempting compilation.

@GrapheneOS@grapheneos.social

It would be trivially detected by widely distributed standard forensic software including the non-Premium variant of Cellebrite able to run on a laptop.

By “duress profile”, I mean that if user has enabled a “duress profile” feature in Settings, then entering the duress PIN would:

1. Erase (the encryption key for) all profiles and storage outside the duress profile; then
2. Unlock the duress profile.

So, how would forensic software detect that the unlocked profile is a duress profile?

@GrapheneOS@grapheneos.social everyone seems to be clamouring for the same thing: add “duress profile” to the roadmap. Keep up the good work.

On 18 Jan 2025, before Proton and Mullvad CEOs came out in support of the far right, Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) recommended:

• Mullvad (Sweden)
• Mozilla VPN* (USA/Sweden)
• Proton VPN (Switzerland)
• Tunnelbear (USA/Canada; owned by McAfee in USA)
• IVPN (Gibraltar)
• Windscribe (Canada)

I’ve crossed out the first three, since Mozilla VPN uses Mullvad, and Mullvad’s and Proton’s CEOs support extremists.

Nym is not on the list, so presumably didn’t meet FPF’s requirements.

https://alternativeto.net/software/find-my-iphone/?license=opensource