

Good point. Codeberg did end up putting Anubis, a proof-of-work challenge, in front of their instance, and as far as I can tell their problems came mostly from AI crawlers rather than from Forgejo itself. A large public forge is exactly what those crawlers target.
Vault42 is aimed mainly at private repositories, which crawlers cannot reach, but our free tier does allow public repositories, so we are not immune. That part of the service needs the same protection, and we plan to handle it with:
- Rate limiting, with stricter limits for anonymous traffic
- Anubis or a similar proof-of-work proxy for anonymous visitors
- Restricting expensive operations such as archive downloads and blame views to signed-in users
Because most of our traffic will come from signed-in users working on private code, the exposure is much smaller than Codeberg’s, but it is certainly something to take seriously.
Thanks for pointing that out!



If you don’t mind me asking some other questions about this: If you are not comfortable stating this publicly you can also mail me at
marijn@vault42.euWhat did this DORA addendum from your Git host actually needed to contain?
Would your company have been willing to go with a smaller company that would be willing to sign it? If not, why not?
What else did your vendor assessment require beyond this addendum?